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LABOR MARKET DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REFORM 
Roger Barker and David Rueda 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The joint stock company is one of the most successful 
socioeconomic institutions of modern society. Along with markets, 
firms serve to mobilize and coordinate the use of capital in the 
generation of economic growth (Roberts 2004: 74). However, unlike 
markets, firms organize production in terms of hierarchical 
authority relations between economic agents (Coase 1937). Their 
pervasiveness in modern economic life is arguably even greater 
than that of markets: according to McMillan, 70% of transactions in 
the US economy occur within firms, as compared to only 30% in 
markets (McMillan 2002:168). 
The dangers inherent in the concept of the limited liability 
company received an early treatment from Adam Smith in The 
Wealth of Nations (1776). Two and a half centuries later, the 
underlying problem remains the same: the distinctive legal 
structure of the corporation offers corporate insiders an 
opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of other 
stakeholders. Such a moral hazard problem creates significant 
dangers for overall societal welfare and stability, given the central 
role played by firms in the production structure of most political 
economies. Societies wishing to enjoy the firm’s economic benefits 
have to decide, either explicitly or implicitly, which actors can be 
trusted to exercise power over the firm, and how that power will be 
restricted and held accountable.  
The authority structure of a firm can be organized in a variety of 
ways. The possible range of permutations has been reflected in the 
post-war diversity of national corporate governance practices, 
which appear to have defied the harmonizing effects of economic 
globalization (Stulz 2005; Dyck and Zingales 2004; Nenova 2003). 
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For example, a distinctive approach to corporate governance has 
underpinned the non-liberal economic models of continental 
Europe. European corporations have operated within a framework 
of incentives that have shielded them from engagement in short-
term earnings and share-price maximization. This has facilitated 
their cooperation with other social actors in fulfillment of the post-
war “corporatist compromise”. More stable corporate behavior has 
also given rise to an environment in which economic actors are 
more willing to engage in long-term commitments and non-market 
forms of cooperation (e.g. in training, R&D, industrial relations, 
etc). This proved to be a particularly efficient form of economic 
organization in the post-war era of “diversified quality production” 
(Streeck 1992). 
There is, however, evidence of significant change underway in 
European corporate governance, particularly since the mid-1990s. 
Most European countries have introduced national codes of 
corporate governance for the first time, along with a range of 
regulatory changes to improve company disclosure, board 
accountability and minority shareholder rights. At the micro-level, 
more and more companies are seeking to project an image of 
“good” corporate governance, in order to secure cheaper finance 
and a higher share price. In addition, supranational institutions, 
such as the European Commission, have been active in promoting 
some degree of harmonization in corporate governance regulations, 
for example through passage of the 2003 Takeover Directive. 
With respect to Europe’s largest economy - Germany—Beyer and 
Höpner (2003) also argue that significant change is underway in 
corporate governance (in contrast to the “Reformstau” in other 
policy areas). At the company level, shareholder orientation is 
being increased through the use of profitability goals, measures to 
increase financial transparency, investor relations activities and the 
increased use of stock options (Beyer and Höpner 2003: 179). The 
amendment of German corporate law in 1998 to include the 
“protection of shareholder value” as a valid corporate objective for 
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the first time in German history is praised by Espen Eckbo as “a 
giant step forward for German corporate governance. Adam Smith 
would have approved” (Eckbo 2005: 3). 
The objective of this paper is to explain both the diversity that 
exists in corporate governance regimes, and account for why it may 
be changing. 
II. WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO EXPLAIN? 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHANGE IN 
INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES. 
Corporate governance is an attribute of political economies that 
varies significantly across countries (La Porta et al 1999; Morck and 
Steier 2005). It also varies significantly across time (Rajan and 
Zingales 2003; Becht and Delong 2004; Morck at al 2004), although 
it is argued that there is also a high level of path dependence in the 
short-to-medium term. 
In the previous section we have hinted at some of the reasons why 
corporate governance matters to the political economy of 
industrialized democracies. Let us be a little more systematic about 
these reasons. First, the fact that the structure of firms differs 
significantly among different countries affects their response to 
common external challenges (Morck and Steier 2005; Roe 2003; Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Knetter 1989). Numerous authors have argued 
convincingly that corporate governance is, in fact, a key factor in 
determining the style of capitalism that prevails in a country 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Aoki 1988; Hall and Soskice 2001).  
Second, corporate governance is not only a fundamental part of a 
political economy system, it has also been related to a plethora of 
economic and political outcomes. Corporate governance is used in 
the economic literature to explain a range of other outcomes: levels 
of economic growth and efficiency (Carlin and Mayer 2000, 2003; 
Mueller 2005); innovation capability (Allen and Gale 1999; Huang 
and Xu 1999); levels of competition (Fulghieri and Suominen 2005); 
6 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 03 
 
financial openness (Stulz 2005); relative prevalence of public and 
private companies; levels of control premia (Dyck and Zingales 
2004); and the emergence of social democracy (Belloc and Pagano 
2005). 
There are several ways of categorizing corporate governance 
systems.  One of the key distinctions is between shareholder and 
stakeholder systems of corporate governance (Letza et al 2004). 
However, this characteristic is difficult to quantify and, arguably, 
all corporate governance systems are stakeholder systems to some 
degree (what varies is the distribution of power amongst 
stakeholders).  In the economics literature, corporate governance is 
also measured in terms of blockholding and minority shareholder 
orientation.  While a blockholding orientation is not entirely 
synonymous with stakeholder corporate governance, it is arguably 
a necessary condition for it to occur.  
Given its multifaceted nature (as well as its conceptual complexity), 
the operationalization of corporate governance in empirical studies 
displays great variance.  As we will make clear below, this paper’s 
theoretical claims are fundamentally concerned with capturing the 
extent to which the monitoring, oversight and control of the 
management of public companies is oriented towards external 
minority shareholders.  This theoretical goal guides our choice of 
dependent variables. 
The variable which is most commonly used in cross-section 
analyses of corporate governance (ownership concentration) is not 
available as a time series. The cross-sectional work in the literature 
has been done with data relating to the early/mid-1990s (La Porta 
et al 1998; Faccio and Lang 2002). Although a team of researchers 
has recently published a more up-to-date snapshot of ownership 
concentration—relating to 2004 (Kho et al 2006) - this is still not a 
measure of corporate governance that can be employed in an in-
depth analysis of corporate governance change employing panel 
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data econometric techniques. We utilize four alternative proxies for 
minority shareholder strength. 
The first is stock market capitalization divided by GDP, also known 
as “equity share”. A higher equity share is taken to imply a greater 
orientation towards external minority shareholders. The issue of 
publicly traded equity (i.e. equity listed and traded on a stock 
exchange) requires that firms submit themselves to an increased 
level of external accountability. In order to buy and hold the equity 
of publicly traded companies, external investors need to be 
persuaded that companies are being operated in their interests (and 
not only the interests of other stakeholders, such as blockholders or 
employees). Consequently, a high proportion of publicly issued 
equity in the financing of corporate activity may be taken to imply 
that firms have been successful in orienting their governance to the 
needs of such external minority stakeholders. 
There are several possible limitations for using this measure as a 
proxy for outsider corporate governance. Firstly, much of an 
economy’s public equity market may be held by blockholders. 
Although a firm may go public as a means of gaining additional 
investment resources from external investors, controlling stakes 
may be held by incumbent blockholders. An indeterminate 
proportion of national equity markets may thus represent the sunk 
investment of insider capital. Secondly, the relative size of an 
economy’s equity market may be driven by institutional factors 
unrelated to corporate governance. For example, the Netherlands 
has a significant private pension sector, which has promoted the 
channeling of savings into equity investment (giving rise to a high 
equity share). This does not necessarily imply, however, that Dutch 
firms are governed with a high minority shareholder orientation. 
Similarly, Switzerland has achieved a high equity share due to the 
pool of savings arising from its status as an offshore banking 
centre.  
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We argue, however, that change in equity share, rather than its 
absolute level, may still provide a useful indication of changing 
patterns of corporate governance. Change is likely to be primarily 
driven by the activities of external minority investors; in contrast, 
blockholder ownership stakes are likely to be relatively unchanging 
(given their strategic rather than short-term profit maximizing 
rationale). Consequently changes in equity share, rather than their 
levels, should say something useful about changes in minority 
shareholder orientation. 
Our second proxy is the total value of shares traded on the stock 
market divided by GDP. The rationale of this measure is similar to 
that of change in equity share. The variable is commonly used as a 
measure of the activity or liquidity of equity markets. However, its 
level is likely to be more reflective of the minority shareholder 
nature of corporate governance than equity share, as blockholder 
equity stakes are much less traded (due to their strategic nature) 
than those of short-term profit-maximizing portfolio investors. 
Consequently, blockholder activities are less likely to distort the 
level of this measure. 
The third proxy is the value of international equity issuance as a 
share of GDP. This is data that is collated by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), and relates to equity issuance that is 
specifically targeted towards non-domestic investors. It consists of 
equity issues falling into three categories: Equity issuance from 
domestic corporations in foreign markets; equity issuance from 
domestic corporations in foreign currency in the domestic market; 
and equity issuance from domestic corporations in domestic 
currency in the domestic market targeted at non-domestic 
investors. Data refers to both initial public offerings and secondary 
equity issuance from existing public companies.  
Unlike Equity Share, the level of this proxy is not distorted by the 
equity ownership activities of blockholders. It does not include, for 
example, issues of equity that are entirely oriented towards 
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domestic incumbent ownership groups. The rationale of this proxy 
is that companies will have to exhibit outsider friendly governance 
if they are to raise significant funds in the market through the 
issuance of such stock. Its main limitation is that equity issuance 
activity—both IPOs and secondary issues - occurs in cycles, 
depending on the current state of market sentiment. Issuance 
boomed in the late 1990s, and then more or less dried-up in most 
markets in 2000 and 2001. These cyclical movements did not reflect 
underlying structural changes in corporate governance, but rather 
the volatilities of the credit cycle. 
Our final proxy for corporate governance is an index of shareholder 
protection that was originally developed by La Porta et al (1998) in 
respect of shareholder protections prevailing in the mid-1990s, but 
which has been updated up to 2002 by Pagano and Volpin (2005). It 
is a summary index of six possible legal protections available to 
external shareholders vis-à-vis company management. Each 
individual protection is evaluated as a dummy variable (1 = 
protection exists, 0 = protection does not exist). Consequently the 
score for each country ranges between 0 and 6.  
The categories of minority shareholder protections are as follows: 
(1) vote by mail, equals one if the law explicitly mandates or sets as 
a default rule that the company must provide a proxy form 
allowing shareholders to vote on the items on the agenda of a 
general shareholders’ meeting by mail; (2) shares not deposited, 
equals 1 if the law does not require, nor explicitly permits 
companies to require, shareholders to deposit with the company or 
another firm any of their shares prior to a general shareholders 
meeting; (3) cumulative voting, equals one if the law explicitly 
mandates or sets as a default rule that shareholders owning 10% or 
less of the capital may cast all their votes for one board of directors 
or supervisory board candidate (cumulative voting) or if the law 
explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule a mechanism of 
proportional representation in the board of directors or supervisory 
board by which shareholders owning 10% or less of the capital 
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stock may name a proportional number of directors to the board; 
(4) oppressed minority, equals one if (minority) shareholders 
owning 10% or less of the capital stock can challenge (i.e. by either 
seeking damages or having the transaction rescinded) resolutions 
that benefit controlling shareholders and damage the company; (5) 
pre-emptive rights, equals one when the law or listing rules 
explicitly mandate or set as a default rule that shareholders hold 
the first opportunity to buy new issues of stock; (6) capital to call a 
meeting, equals one when capital needed to call a shareholders’ 
meeting (directly or through the courts) is less than or equal to 10 
percent. 
Table 1 presents the data for all our dependent variables: 
international equity issuance, equity market capitalization, value of 
equity traded, and the shareholder protection index.  The table lists 
the values for all countries included in the analysis in a range of 
years.  The table makes clear that there is a great degree of cross-
country and temporal variance in our analysis.  We will explain in 
the following section, why we think that insider labor is an 
important explanation of this variation. 
[Table 1] 
The above table summarizes how our measures for the dependent 
variable have changed since the early 1980s. International equity 
issuance, equity market capitalization and the value of equity 
traded have substantially increased their share of GDP in each of 
the countries in our database, suggesting an overall trend towards 
more outsider-oriented corporate governance practices at the level 
of the firm. These increases have been apparent in both liberal 
market economies and coordinated market economies. However, as 
the latter have generally started from a much lower base, the 
percentage increases in many cases have been significantly higher. 
International equity issuance is a more volatile series than equity 
share and value traded, due to the more “lumpy” nature of 
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primary (rather than secondary) market transactions. In fact, in the 
early 1980s, there was very little international equity issuance being 
undertaken in many countries. All three series also reflect the 
impact of a strong upswing in equity market valuations, issuance 
and trading at the end of the 1990s—the so-called “technology 
bubble” - which ended with a significant downturn in equity 
markets in 2000. However, by 2003/2004 the measures had, in 
many countries, started to increase again, although remaining 
below the cyclical peaks attained in 1999/2000. 
Our regulatory measure of corporate governance change has 
exhibited less change over the period for which we have data. 
However, the overall trend is, once again, in favor of greater 
minority shareholder protections in most countries. One country in 
which significant change has been recorded by our regulatory 
measure is Italy. Italy has reformed its outsider-hostile regulatory 
framework into a system offering similar levels of minority 
protections as available to shareholders in liberal market 
economies. However, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark and 
Switzerland still appear to offer a poor level of protection to 
outsider shareholders, at least as of 2002. 
Regardless of the extent of change of individual series, the level of 
all of the measures reveals the tendency of liberal market 
economies (UK, US, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) to 
exhibit a stronger outsider-orientation, whilst the coordinated 
market and Mediterranean economies exhibit a weaker outsider-
orientation. The main exceptions to this pattern arise from equity 
market data relating to the Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland. The latter two countries are offshore banking centres, 
and therefore benefit from “artificially” high inflows into their 
domestic capital markets from foreign capital. Netherlands—in 
contrast to other coordinated market economies—has a developed 
a significant privately-funded pensions sector, which has caused its 
equity market to develop significantly relative to its domestic 
economy. 
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III. THE ARGUMENT: INSIDER LABOR AND INSIDER 
CAPITAL 
A. WHAT IS INSIDER LABOR? 
The traditional conception of social democracy rests on the 
assumption that there is a connection between Left government 
and labor as a whole. In other work, however, Rueda (2005, 2006 
and 2007) has argued that labor is divided into two segments: those 
with secure employment (insiders) and those without (outsiders).  
Since the early 1970s, insiders have become insulated from 
unemployment.  Not only do they enjoy high levels of protection, 
they also benefit from the fact that outsiders act as a buffer bearing 
the brunt of fluctuations in the business cycle.   
The starting point for our analysis is that the interests of labor 
market insiders and outsiders are fundamentally different and, in 
some circumstances, contradictory.  In terms of labor market 
protection, insiders care about their own job security while 
outsiders care about unemployment and job precariousness much 
more than about the employment protection of insiders. 
The division between insiders and outsiders, therefore, is 
essentially related to the unemployment vulnerability of different 
actors in the labor market.  Insiders are workers with highly 
protected jobs.  Factors like the nature of employment protection 
legislation, a company’s firing and job search costs, insiders’ 
production process skills and attained levels of company 
investment, and the behavior of unions contribute to the level of 
protection that characterizes “insiderness.”  Insiders are sufficiently 
protected by the level of security in their jobs not to feel 
significantly threatened by increases in unemployment.  Outsiders, 
on the other hand, are either unemployed or hold jobs 
characterized by low levels of protection and employment rights, 
lower salaries, and precarious levels of benefits and social security 
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regulations.  The unemployed, the involuntary fixed-term 
employed and the involuntary part-time employed are outsiders.1 
The differences in the interests of insiders and outsiders have 
dramatic consequences for the preferences of both groups 
regarding corporate governance. In this paper’s framework, there 
are two dimensions in which labor insiders and outsiders diverge: 
the levels protection of labor insiders and the openness of the 
corporate governance system.  Outsiders are not benefited by high 
job insider labor protection since it represents a shelter for insiders 
from competition from outsiders.  In their role as consumers, 
outsiders are also not benefited by the limitation in competition 
represented by a blockholder-centered corporate governance 
system.  Labor outsiders, therefore, do support competition in the 
labor market and in the corporate governance system.  Insiders, on 
the other hand, are obviously benefited from high job protection 
limiting the competition from outsiders.  They are also in favor of a 
blockholder-centered corporate governance system since, as we 
will make clear below, it represents a system in which both insider 
labor and insider capital mutually benefit from limiting 
competition. 
B. WHAT IS INSIDER CAPITAL? 
The distinction between insider and outsider capital is relatively 
well established in the corporate governance literature (Franks and 
Mayer 1995; Hellwig 2000; Pagano and Volpin 2001). Insider capital 
is a category of owner that seeks to establish a significant degree of 
direct control over the management of individual public 
companies, normally through ownership of a large proportion of 
the company’s equity capital. Unlike in a company with a 
diversified ownership base, such an ownership strategy reduces the 
                                                 
1 See Rueda (2007: chapter 2), for a more detailed explanation of the differences 
between insiders and outsiders. 
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scope for a separation of the functions of ownership and control. In 
such circumstances, both management and the dominant 
blockholder can be viewed as company “insiders” in the sense that 
they are able to exert direct control over the company’s assets and 
activities. 
A public company whose ownership is dominated by insider 
capital occupies, in effect, an intermediate position between a 
private company and a public company with diffuse ownership. In 
the former case, the owner (for example, the founding 
entrepreneur) often enjoys full control of the company through 
ownership of a large proportion of the company’s equity. However, 
the lack of a public listing restricts access to external capital. In the 
case of a public company with diffuse ownership, a stockmarket 
listing facilitates access to external equity financing from capital 
markets, however there are no longer control rights enjoyed by any 
single investor (Hellwig 2000).  
By securing control rights over a public company, therefore, insider 
capital seeks to achieve the best of both the private and public 
corporate worlds: access to the increased financing opportunities 
associated with a public listing, and retention of the control rights 
typically enjoyed by the owners of private companies (Hellwig 
2000: 101). Such an ownership structure has been characteristic of 
many public companies in the post-war corporate sectors of 
coordinated market economies, particularly in continental Europe 
(Becht and Mayer 2001). 
In contrast, outsider capital describes those owners with relatively 
small equity participations in individual companies. Such minority 
shareholders tend to be passive holders of a company’s stock. Their 
ownership participation is focused on financial returns - through 
receipt of dividends and an increased share price. Outsider capital 
does not generally seek to influence company performance directly, 
e.g. by exerting pressure on company management. In the case of 
management underperformance, their main sanction is to sell the 
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shares, i.e. to exercise a policy of “exit” rather than “voice” 
(Hirschman 1970). Such an ownership policy has been typical of 
institutional investors—such as pension funds, mutual funds and 
insurance companies—which are the predominant class of 
investors in Liberal Market Economies. 
In order to acquire control rights, it is necessary for insider-oriented 
investors to take substantial positions in the equity securities of 
individual companies. Although equity participation in excess of 
50% of the votable stock ensures control, it is often possible to 
achieve effective control with significantly smaller blockholdings, 
e.g. 15-20% or less. This might be possible if the blockholder is able 
to coordinate the voting activities of smaller shareholders. 
Alternatively, the firm may permit issuance of different classes of 
share, some of which may provide multiple votes at company 
general meetings. Owners of the latter category of share may, 
therefore, be able to attain control whist owning only a relatively 
small proportion of the total equity capital.  
Smaller blockholdings may also be sufficient for effective control 
due to the collective action problem faced by minority 
shareholders, who may not be able to mobilize and coordinate the 
support of their fellow minority shareholders against the wishes of 
a large blockholder. This is likely to be a particular problem if the 
ownership stakes of individual minority shareholders are low, e.g. 
below 1% of a firm’s total market capitalization, as is typical of an 
institutional investor in a Liberal Market Economy.  
The portfolio diversification strategy of an outsider-oriented 
investor is fundamentally different to that of insider capital. 
Outsider investors seek to avoid the high levels of concentration 
risk that arise from taking large positions in individual firms. By 
investing in the equity of a large number of companies, outsider 
capital seeks to benefit from the diversification benefits identified 
by modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 1952). However, the price 
that is paid for such a diffuse ownership strategy is an inability to 
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exert direct control over the management of individual companies. 
Unless explicit legal or regulatory safeguards exist to safeguard 
their interests (described in the literature as quality corporate law 
or minority shareholder protection), minority shareholders’ main 
channel of influence over company management is via the effect of 
aggregate buying and selling decisions on the company share price, 
which plays a role in determining the vulnerability of the firm to 
hostile takeover bids (Manne 1965), and the access of the firm to 
external financing from equity capital markets. 
The cleavage between insider and outsider capital is defined here 
in terms of ownership strategy rather than institutional form. 
However, within the major industrialized democracies it is possible 
to identify categories of organization that are frequently associated 
with insider or outsider investment strategies. For example, an 
insider capital strategy is generally employed by pyramidal 
business groups, which are ubiquitous players in the corporate 
sectors of many countries (Morck and Steier 2005; La Porta et al 
1999). In such a structure an apex shareholder (often a wealthy 
family) directly controls a single company (which may or may not 
be publicly listed), which in turn controls large blockholdings in 
other companies. A complex web of cross-shareholdings may exist 
across the corporate sector, although ultimate control may 
ultimately reside with an opaque group of elite actors. 
Blockholding has also been pursued in many post-war coordinated 
market economies by industrial corporations (through cross-
shareholdings in other corporations), universal banks (particularly 
in Germany and Japan), family networks (e.g. the Wallenberg 
family empire in Sweden), the state (e.g. via nationalization or 
public investment in “strategic” industries), and a complex mixture 
of each of these institutional types. In contrast, outsider capital 
behavior is characteristic of institutional investors, such as pension 
funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and hedge funds, which 
dominate the ownership structure of liberal market economies.  




Acquiring direct hierarchical control of management is one way of 
mitigating potential principal-agent problems between owners and 
managers (Stiglitz 1985; Allen and Gale 2000). Rather than relying 
on incentives provided by capital market signals, owners can 
control more directly the extent to which managers are 
administering the firm in their interests. In particular, the 
information asymmetries that plague principal-agent relationships 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976), e.g. concerning the firm’s technology, 
business environment or earning’s prospects, can be minimized 
without recourse to a complex institutional framework of financial 
contracting vis-à-vis external shareholders. However, once they 
have acquired control, there will remain little incentive for insider 
capital to support the introduction of corporate governance 
safeguards for minority shareholders, e.g. strong non-executive 
boards, financial reporting requirements, laws to secure the voting 
rights of minorities, etc. The potential agency costs generated by a 
weak corporate governance framework are no longer something to 
which they are exposed (Rajan and Zingales 2003). 
Indeed, in the absence of regulatory safeguards, blockholders may 
seek to exploit their position of control to expropriate resources 
from minority shareholders via a variety of mechanisms. These 
could take the form of directing management to favor chosen 
suppliers, choosing management based on non-meritocratic or 
dynastic considerations, or requiring management to pursue a 
business strategy based on personal objectives rather than profit or 
value maximization. At worst, control rights may facilitate the 
blockholder’s ability to undertake outright theft of the company’s 
assets, or to indulge in insider trading. Each of these (and many 
other) forms of self-dealing may ultimately result in insiders 
benefiting disproportionately from their investment in a firm—
either in financial or non-financial terms - in relation to minority 
shareholders. 
18 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 03 
 
In a similar way to the position enjoyed by insider labor, insider 
capital is ultimately representative of incumbent ownership 
interests in a political economy. A major concern of any incumbent 
is likely to be its ability to sustain that position of incumbency 
against potential competition (Morck and Steier 2005: 40). 
Incumbents are unlikely to take a positive view of any policy—such 
as law and regulation safeguarding the rights of minority 
shareholders—that reduces the barriers to entry faced by non-
incumbents, and thereby increases the competitive pressure on 
their enterprises. Such a perspective is also likely to color their 
attitude towards the development of capital markets. Whereas 
insider capital has already sunk the capital to finance its existing 
operations, and may be able to finance incremental investment 
from retained earnings or insider networks, capital markets offer 
the potential for non-incumbents to raise funds, and subsequently 
threaten the position of existing players. In short, insider capital 
may not only view corporate governance reform and the 
encouragement of capital markets as unnecessary for its ownership 
strategy, but also as a threat to its position of incumbency in the 
domestic corporate sector (Rajan and Zingales 2003). 
A second major difference between the preferences of insider 
capital and outsider capital relates to the way in which they may 
operate as political actors. The ownership of control rights in 
corporations of strategic national importance by a relatively small 
number of influential investors may facilitate their ability to 
exercise influence over the political process. As Mancur Olson has 
argued, interest groups that can organize themselves—for example, 
due to their relatively small size and commonality of interest—will 
have a greater chance of becoming significant political actors than 
diffusely organized interests, and will bargain with other organized 
interest groups at the expense of those interests that are not able to 
organize themselves (Olson 1982: 37). As a small and cohesive 
group of elite actors, insider capital is potentially able to acquire 
political leverage that can be used to protect its incumbent position 
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and block the lobbying demands of minority shareholders for law 
and regulation to protect their interests relative to blockholders.  
In contrast, individual minority shareholders may find it more 
difficult to achieve a similar level of direct political influence. The 
low level of their investment positions in individual companies will 
not accord them the status of major strategic players in a domestic 
political economy. Furthermore, their lack of long-term 
commitment to individual companies and, more generally, to 
national economies is not conducive to a high level of domestic 
political legitimacy.  
Within individual political economies, outsider capital tends to be 
composed of a larger number of individual investors, with a wide 
diversity of styles and strategies. Furthermore, many are non-
domestic investment institutions, which have no interest in political 
involvement in foreign contexts. Just as they are faced with a 
collective action problem in exerting control over individual 
companies, outsider investors face similar difficulties in unifying 
their interests for the purpose of political lobbying. Their main 
influence over the political process is likely to result from their 
aggregate investment decisions—transmitted via the price 
signaling mechanisms of capital markets. The ultimate impact of 
such market signals on political outcomes may well be significant. 
However, it will be difficult for outsider capital to operate as a 
cohesive political actor capable of determining corporate 
governance outcomes through participation in domestic 
distributional coalitions with other organized social actors.  
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSIDER LABOR AND INSIDER 
CAPITAL. 
Our argument is driven by the preferences of four social actors: 
insider labor, outsider labor, insider capital and outsider capital. As 
suggested above, insider labor and outsider labor are assumed to 
have opposing preferences in respect of the labor market. Insider 
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labor favors policies and practices that provide a high level job 
security and favorable conditions of employment for its own 
constituents, i.e. those employees already in secure and well-paid 
jobs. Outsider labor favors a competitive labor market, offering a 
level playing field for all types of employee. 
Analogously, insider capital and outsider capital have opposing 
preferences in terms of capital markets and corporate governance. 
Insider capital wishes to discourage the entry of new competitors 
into domestic product markets, and therefore opposes 
liberalization of capital markets and the enhancement of minority 
shareholder protections. In contrast, outsider capital wishes to 
participate in domestic product markets on equal terms with 
insider capital, and therefore favors measures that encourage new 
market entrants, such as the development of capital markets and 
the protection of minority shareholders. 
The preferences of capital and labor actors overlap in respect of 
product market competition. Both insider capital and insider labor 
would like to see limitations on the competitiveness of domestic 
product markets, resulting in the generation of product market 
rents. Insider capital benefits from these rents directly.2 However, 
insider labor also benefits from these rents through higher wages 
and improved job security, which are offered to them by insider 
capital. Consequently, both insider actors benefit from the rents 
generated through the uncompetitiveness of domestic product 
markets.  
                                                 
2 The are also political benefits for insider capital in its alliance with insider labor. 
The main objective of insider capital is the retention of a position of corporate 
sector incumbency. However, it is by no means obvious that a corporate 
framework favoring the interests of existing corporate elites is likely to command 
political support. A political coalition with insider labor offers insider capital a 
more realistic chance of retaining its incumbency. 
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The losers in this process are both types of outsider actor. Outsider 
labor, as a consumer, has to pay higher prices in uncompetitive 
domestic product markets.3 However, unlike insider labor, it does 
not receive any benefit from these higher prices in the form of 
improved conditions of employment and better job security. 
Outsider capital is also a loser. It is unable to gain access to 
domestic product markets. And it runs the risk of expropriation of 
its capital in cases where it co-invests in a blockholder-controlled 
firm in a political economy lacking minority shareholder 
protections, as indicated in the previous section. 
In short, an insider-dominated economy provides a means of 
extracting rents from outsider actors, and passing the benefit of 
these rents to insider actors, both in the form of financial rewards 
and improved employment conditions. This was the situation 
prevailing in the ‘golden age of social democracy’ and beyond.  Up 
to the 1980s, many European economies were characterized by a 
system whose primary purpose was to benefit insiders at the 
expense of outsiders via the mechanisms described above. We will 
show below, however, that insider labor has seen its power decline 
in recent years in most of these countries.  What are the 
implications for our argument when insider labor experiences a 
reduction in its strength? 
The main consequences of a decline in insider labor power derive 
from the fact that outsider labor has different preferences vis-à-vis 
product market competition. It objects to paying the higher product 
market prices that generate the rents for insider labor and insider 
capital. It seeks to eliminate these rents by promoting a greater 
degree of product market competition.4 One means by which this 
                                                 
3 This is the situation described by Rogowski and Kayser (2002) as a “producer 
orientation”. 
4 To use Rogowski and Kayser’s terminology once again, it seeks to move from a 
“producer” to a “consumer” orientation (Rogowski and Kayser 2002). 
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can be achieved is via the liberalization of capital markets and 
corporate governance reform, thereby encouraging the entry into 
domestic product markets of non-incumbent capital, i.e. outsider 
capital.5  
Consequently, the weakening of insider labor (and, consequently, 
the parallel strengthening of outsider labor) will cause corporate 
governance change as a result of two mechanisms. Firstly, a less 
insider-oriented labor sector will push for a liberalization of 
corporate governance and capital market regulation, in order to 
promote the entry of more competitors into domestic product 
markets. Secondly, insider capital will recognize that its ability to 
secure high rents is less secure. At some point, the discounted value 
of its future rental stream will no longer compensate it for the high 
level of its concentration risk. Consequently, it will increasingly 
focus on ways it can diversify out of its existing concentrated 
positions at the highest possible price. The main means of 
achieving this will be to adopt corporate governance practices (and 
promote regulatory changes) that are favorable to outsider 
investors. In other words, the preferences of insider capital vis-à-vis 
capital markets and corporate governance will experience a major 
shift in an outsider direction as insider labor strength diminishes. 
In summary, a corporate governance regime that acts as a barrier to 
entry to outsider capital involvement– due to a lack of protections 
for minority shareholders—is likely to be reflective of a 
distributional coalition between insider labor and insider capital. 
We would expect there to be a high level of correlation between 
measures of the strength of insider labor and a corporate 
governance outcome that is unfavorable to minority shareholders. 
However, if the strength of insider labor declines, we would expect 
                                                 
5 It is important to point out that there is no basis for a partnership between 
outsider labor and insider capital, as outsider labor is the ultimate source of 
insider rents. 
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this to be associated with an improvement in the investment 
environment for minority shareholders, as measured both by the 
actual behavior of company management and the legal and 
regulatory regime.  
IV. RELATING OUR ARGUMENT TO THE EXISTING 
LITERATURE. 
A number of theoretical approaches have been utilized to explain 
comparative patterns of corporate governance, and why they may 
be subject to change. Most of the explicit theorizing in this area has 
taken place since the mid-1990s, following the publication of a 
number of studies highlighting the extent of variation in corporate 
governance practices across a range of developed and emerging 
economies (Franks and Mayer 1990, 1997; Claessens et al 1998; La 
Porta et al 1999; Barca and Becht 2001; Faccio and Lang 2002). 
However, an earlier starting point for an explanation of corporate 
governance is the neoclassical economic theory of the firm. 
The fundamental insight of neoclassical economic theory is that the 
raison d’être of the firm as an organizational entity is the 
enhancement of efficiency through the reduction of transaction 
costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975; Grossman and Hart 1980). This 
suggests that efficiency considerations should guide all aspects of a 
firm’s organizational structure, including its corporate governance 
arrangements. This type of argument has led some commentators 
to predict a convergence in national corporate governance regimes. 
Companies that do not adopt the most efficient corporate 
governance practices—in terms of reducing agency costs—will find 
themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Given the intensity of 
global competition, such firms are likely to either disappear or 
adjust their strategy so as to converge on best practice (Alchian 
1950; Stigler 1958; Hayek 1967; Hansmann and Kraakmann 2000). 
In particular, firms that adopt outsider- oriented corporate 
governance practices will acquire easier and cheaper access to 
external funding, given the “weight of money” in the hands of 
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outsider-oriented institutional investors in global capital markets 
(Hall and Soskice 2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Juergens et 
al 2000; Shinn 2000, 2001). 
A related argument is that the firm is engaged in an evolutionary 
process matching the increasing complexity of the overall economic 
environment (Chandler 1990). The culmination of this development 
is a situation in which meritocratically-selected professional 
managers exert control over the largest public companies, and the 
amateurish meddling of family or elite capitalist interests is 
eliminated. The model of corporate governance that supports this 
development is one of diffuse ownership and minority shareholder 
protection, i.e. an outsider system of corporate governance, 
equivalent to that prevailing in the Liberal Market Economies, 
which frees managers from the direct hierarchical control of 
owners. Once again, if firms do not conform to this pattern, they 
are likely to become inefficient and ultimately disappear. 
A second strand in the economics literature has suggested factors 
that might work against the adoption of identical corporate 
governance practices. Firms differ in terms of their technology, 
scale and scope of activities, and in terms of the size of market in 
which they operate. Some activities are more opaque to external 
investors than others (e.g. the activities of a technology company 
versus a natural resources company). The way in which firms seek 
to minimize agency costs may therefore depend on the specific 
nature of their economic activities. Different types of corporate 
governance arrangements may need to be employed by different 
firms in order to reassure external investors that agency costs are 
indeed being minimized. This could result in significant firm-level 
or sectoral variation in corporate governance outcomes (Gourevitch 
and Shinn 2005: 36; Burkhart et al 1997; Carlin and Mayer 2003). 
Although influential in the popular discourse on corporate 
governance, each of the above arguments has difficulty in 
accounting for observable patterns of comparative corporate 
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governance. National corporate governance diversity has endured 
despite the  increased involvement of foreign investors in domestic 
equity markets and the lower funding costs obtainable through the 
adoption of minority shareholder-oriented governance practices 
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 105; Gompers at al 2001). 
Furthermore, corporate governance continues to exhibit greatest 
variance at the national level, not at the level of the firm or sector of 
activity (Stulz 2005; La Porta et al 1998), and corporate governance 
regimes appear only loosely related to the level of a country’s 
economic development (Rajan and Zingales 2003; Roe 2003; Morck 
and Steier 2005). The market incentives favoring outsider corporate 
governance do not, therefore, appear sufficient to overcome the 
potency of nationally-based explanatory variables—such as the 
strength of insider labor—which we argue remain the most 
influential determinants of comparative outcomes. 
An alternative approach to corporate governance has been 
developed by legal scholars, following seminal articles by La Porta 
et al (1997, 1998). Three propositions emerge from this literature, 
each of which may be evaluated separately. The first is that the 
legal and regulatory environment is an essential determinant of 
corporate governance outcomes (this contrasts with an implicit 
assumption of the economic theory of the firm: that corporate 
governance outcomes will be determined by the private behavior of 
independent economic agents). The “law matters” perspective 
asserts that law is required to shape the incentives of rational 
actors, and thereby determine the nature of firm-level corporate 
governance behavior (Schliefer and Wolfenzon 2002).  
The empirical evidence regarding this assertion is mixed. A 
number of countries—such as the UK and Canada—have 
historically developed a minority shareholder-oriented governance 
regime in the absence of significant legal or regulatory incentives. 
The legal protections for minority shareholders identified as crucial 
for corporate governance by La Porta et al have only been 
introduced into developed economies in the relatively recent past 
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(Franks et al 2004; Morck et al 2004). Furthermore, there are several 
prominent examples of countries that possess significant legal 
protections for minority shareholders, and yet continue to be 
dominated by blockholders (Roe 2003: 7). Our analytical 
framework takes an agnostic position on this issue. We utilize both 
regulatory and behavioral measures of corporate governance as 
proxies for our dependent variable, implying both a recognition of 
the importance of the regulatory framework and a need to evaluate 
the direct impact of our explanatory variables on actual corporate 
governance outcomes. 
A second proposition from the legal literature is that corporate 
governance outcomes are primarily determined by a specific kind 
of law and regulation: namely, the corporate and securities law 
directly relating to minority shareholder protections. Although 
general tort law, for example, provides an underlying framework 
for the enforcement of contracts, it is arguably insufficient to 
determine the nature of a corporate governance regime. Equally, 
law or regulation which is not directly focused on corporate 
governance, e.g. labor law, competition law, etc, will not be 
instrumental in driving firm-level corporate governance behavior 
(La Porta et al 1998).  
This narrow focus on corporate and securities law is criticized by 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), who point to the empirical value of 
considering the impact of a wider range of law and regulation in 
determining corporate governance outcomes. In particular, they 
argue that all laws affecting the overall “degree of coordination” of 
an economy are of relevance. This includes laws relating to the 
labor market, competition policy, training and education, the 
regulation of financial institutions, pension legislation, etc. Such an 
outlook draws on Hall and Soskice’s (2001) view that corporate 
governance will be structured to be “complementary” with the 
other component part of a political economy. Our theoretical claims 
are compatible with these two perspectives (we accept that laws 
and regulations both specific and beyond corporate and securities 
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law are relevant to corporate governance outcomes), but we 
emphasize the influence of a more political factor: the strength of 
insider labor. 
Perhaps the most controversial component of the “law matters” 
approach to corporate governance is the hypothesis that legal 
origin is the key determinant of corporate and securities law 
orientation. According to this argument, a key distinction exists 
between countries that have developed on the basis of common 
law, and those inheriting a civil law tradition. Common law 
systems are characterized by judicial independence, the importance 
of precedent and less emphasis on codification relative to civil law 
systems. In contrast, the civil law tradition has given rise to a more 
centralized legal system, with insistence on codification, and 
consequently a greater potential scope for state-driven political 
influence (Rajan and Zingales 1999). 
Although La Porta et al (1998: 1147) present cross-sectional 
evidence linking a country’s legal family and its corporate 
governance (measured as ownership concentration), their analysis 
is highly dependent on the historical period chosen (the mid-
1990s). The significant historical variation of corporate governance 
outcomes over the last century casts doubt on the validity of a 
explanatory variable such as legal origin which is time invariant 
(Rajan and Zingales 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). We argue 
that this paper’s explanation of corporate governance is in a better 
position to explain corporate governance change due to its 
observable variation over time. 
The explanation of corporate governance outcomes in terms of 
political alliances between social actors has been explored by a 
number of scholars (Cyert and March 1963; Aoki 1986; Jackson et al 
2004; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), for 
example, utilize a framework with three social actors—investors, 
employees and management—and consider the corporate 
governance outcomes of six possible coalitions between these 
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actors. Their contention is that a “corporatist compromise”—
between employees and management—best describes the coalition 
that has driven corporate governance outcomes in post-war 
continental Europe, while a co-called “investor model”—between 
owners and management - is the political alliance that has 
prevailed in the UK and US.  
Our theoretical framework shares with Gourevitch and Shinn the 
perspective that some kind of social partnership between capital 
and labor has driven corporate governance outcomes in 
coordinated market economies. However, as Gourevitch and Shinn 
themselves recognize, their chosen classes of social actor —
management, employees and investors—may be too broad to offer 
significant explanatory power. Although they subsequently 
identify the distinction between insider and outsider capital as 
relevant for corporate governance outcomes, our analysis 
highlights the importance of recognizing an equivalent insider-
outsider cleavage in labor. 
Several frameworks have been proposed linking political 
institutions to corporate governance. Using Lijphart’s (1999) 
typology of political institutions, several writers have noted a 
correlation between majoritarian institutions and minority 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance outcomes, and between 
consensus political institutions and blockholder outcomes 
(Gourevitch et al 2003; Pagano and Volpin 2005). According to 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), consensus political institutions and 
insider corporate governance are complementary components of a 
political economy which seeks to promote credible commitments 
amongst economic actors and a willingness to invest in specific 
assets. Majoritarian institutions engender more uncertainty in 
terms of policy formation, and therefore necessitate more flexible 
corporate behavior. Such adaptability is complementary with more 
outsider-oriented corporate governance, which encourages 
management to constantly adapt in response to changing market 
signals. 
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Pagano and Volpin (2005) make a similar link between political 
institutions and corporate governance via a formal median voter 
model. According to their argument, a PR electoral system tends to 
increase the probability of coalition government. This leads to an 
increase in the focus of government policy on the preferences of 
homogeneous political groupings, which they assume are social 
actors favoring weak protections for minority shareholders. In 
contrast, their framework suggests that majoritarian systems will 
emphasize the importance of pivotal groups that are less politically 
aligned, which they assume are actors supporting minority 
shareholders (Pagano and Volpin 2005, p.1006). Perotti and von 
Thadden (2001) also present a median voter model, which 
determines outcomes in terms of alliances between shareholders, 
employees and creditors. 
The difficulty of utilizing political institutions to explaining 
corporate governance outcomes is similar to that relating to the 
legal origin argument: the largely static nature of the explanatory 
variable (although there have been some limited recent examples of 
significant electoral system change; Norris 2004). Consequently, we 
once again emphasize the significance of our proposed model as an 
explanation of temporal, as well as cross-national, corporate 
governance changes. 
The idea of financial openness driving the capital market 
orientation of the financial system—and by implication the outsider 
nature of corporate governance—is explored by Rajan and Zingales 
(2003). In a similar manner to this paper’s analysis, they argue that 
incumbent blockholders will oppose an equity-oriented financial 
system because the latter increases the competitiveness of the 
business environment. Capital markets offer a source of financing 
to new entrants, which could lead to an erosion of the “positional 
rents” of incumbents. However, the increased openness of the 
economy—either in terms of trade or capital flows—serves to 
increase the competitiveness of the economy independently of 
changes to the financial system. In such circumstances, incumbents 
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are more willing to accept reform of the financial system, i.e. a shift 
to a financial system based on capital markets, as they have less to 
lose from such a change (Rajan and Zingales 2003: 7). The likely 
concomitant of such a shift will be a willingness to accept corporate 
governance reform in favor of minority shareholders. 
As the authors themselves acknowledge, a potential criticism of 
this argument is its endogeneity. Why would incumbents agree to 
greater openness in the first place if the result was deterioration in 
their competitive position (Gourevitch 1986; Rogowski 1989; 
O’Rourke and Williamson 1999)? Rajan and Zingales argue that 
many countries have no choice but to open-up; they are small and 
are located close to other countries, and they seek to test this by 
showing that country size is significant as an instrument for 
openness in their regressions on financial development. They also 
argue that - if openness is associated with greater overall prosperity 
- countries will not wish to fall behind their neighbors who are 
benefiting from such prosperity, and will therefore be driven to 
open-up. Nonetheless, the danger remains that openness and 
financial market outsiderness are endogenous variables whose 
correlation is primarily reflective of their mutual dependence on a 
third explanatory variable. Our argument is that this additional 
variable is the strength of insider labor. It should also be noted that 
Deeg and Perez (2000) find no correlation between the introduction 
of capital mobility changes in Spain, France, Italy and Germany, 
and the advent of financial sector and corporate governance reform 
(Deeg and Perez 2000: 142). 
The role of labor in driving corporate governance outcomes has 
been highlighted in the work of Mark Roe (1994, 2003). However, in 
contrast to our theoretical perspective, Roe’s argument is not based 
on a social partnership between employees and owners. Roe argues 
that incumbent capital is forced to take concentrated ownership 
stakes in order to counter the political power of labor (which the 
latter manifests through its ability to deliver Left governments). As 
blockholders they can exert direct hierarchical control over 
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management to counter the strength of labor. In contrast, minority 
shareholders cannot exert this type of direct control over 
management. They are faced with agency costs spiraling out of 
control as management will be more influenced by the wishes of 
employees (operating through the intervention of left government)  
than minority shareholders. Consequently Left labor power is 
associated with blockholding, and labor weakness with a 
shareholder model of corporate governance. 
In a recent paper Cioffi and Höpner (2006) claim—based on 
qualitative case studies relating to France, Germany, Italy and the 
US - that recent shifts towards a minority-shareholder orientation 
have primarily been  promoted by centre-left parties, contrary to 
what would be expected according to Roe’s explanatory 
framework. Cioffi and Höpner’s rationalization of this policy stance 
is that partisan opponents on the centre-right are too enmeshed 
with the interests of existing managerial elites, and are therefore 
unwilling to support regulatory change favoring minority 
shareholders. In contrast, political entrepreneurs on the Left see 
corporate governance reform as an opportunity to undermine 
capitalist incumbents, and also present a modernist image that 
reaches out beyond core constituents. This leads centre-left 
parties—ironically –to adopt a more neo-liberal policy stance in 
corporate governance than that adopted by the centre-right. 
Our own theoretical claims differ from both of these competing 
perspectives. Unlike Roe, our argument is cast in terms of the 
relative strength of a particular cleavage of labor rather than the 
absolute strength of labor as a whole.6 According to Roe’s 
approach, if labor in general is strong, the result will be a greater 
orientation to Left government and policies favoring a 
blockholding corporate governance outcome. However, our 
                                                 
6 Rueda (2005, 2006 and 2007) convincingly argues that identifying Left 
government (or Social Democracy) with labor as a whole is a mistake. 
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argument is centered on the position of a particular labor actor that 
in practice represents a limited proportion of the labor force. We 
argue that it is the strength of this sub-group—rather than labor in 
general—that is key to determining corporate governance 
outcomes. 
Secondly, our analytical framework emphasizes—in contrast to 
Roe—the role of a social partnership between labor and capital in 
determining corporate governance outcomes in coordinated market 
economies. We disagree with the notion that insider capital is in a 
position to counter labor in a political economy in which labor is a 
dominant actor. If incumbent capitalist are dominant over the 
behavior of companies (which, according to Roe, is the main 
purpose of blockholding), it seems likely that there will be 
significant collaboration from labor-dominated Left governments. 
The fact that incumbent capitalists interests are permitted to retain 
their key role in corporate governance in political systems 
characterized by strong Left labor is suggestive of the existence of 
some kind of social partnership or quid pro quo.   
V. THE ANALYSIS: VARIABLES AND 
METHODOLOGY. 
We test our hypotheses with data for a maximum of 18 OECD 
countries between 1976 and 2004.7 The countries included in the 
sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
We measure the power of insider labor with three different 
variables: employment protection, wage growth in manufacturing 
and hours worked in manufacturing.  The justification for these 
                                                 
7 The availability of the data limits our analysis to fewer observations in some 
regressions, see details below. 
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variables is pretty straightforward.  High levels of employment 
protection insulate insiders from unemployment vulnerability and 
competition from insiders. Employment protection is, in fact, an 
essential part of the definition of “insiderness.”  We therefore 
expect employment protection to be a reflection of insider power 
and to determine changes in corporate governance.  We also argue 
that the power of insider labor is captured by higher wage growth 
and lower working hours in manufacturing.  When insiders are 
significant in an economy, we expect them to dominate the 
manufacturing sector (it would be more complicated to make this 
argument about the service sector, for example).  The power of 
insider labor should therefore be correlated with better working 
conditions, both in terms of wages and working hours.  Our 
argument is based on the existence of a partnership between 
insider labor and insider capital.  We explained above that this 
partnership relies on extracting rents from outsiders.  We 
hypothesize that these rents are reflected in higher wages and 
lower working hours for insiders in the manufacturing sector. 
A number of different options exist for measuring the levels of 
employment protection in OECD countries. For the analysis in this 
paper, we will use a variable provided in Baker, Glyn, Howell, and 
Schmitt (2004). The data were created by joining together several 
series: an original one from Lazear (1990), an update using OECD 
data from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), and a further update and 
interpolation from Nickell and Nunziata (2000).8 The variable 
ranges from 0 to 2, where higher values mean stricter employment 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that the OECD data, used from 1985 onward, is 
constructed on the basis of a more extensive collection of employment protection 
dimensions. Lazear’s index measures the severance pay and advance notice a 
blue-collar worker with ten years of service receives upon termination without 
cause.  The OECD index is constructed by averaging the scores obtained by each 
country in three categories: “procedural inconveniences which the employer 
faces when trying to dismiss employees; notice and severance pay provisions; 
and prevailing standards of and penalties for unfair dismissal” (OECD 1999: 54). 
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protection.  We measure growth in manufacturing wages as the 
percentage annual change in the hourly compensation costs for 
production workers in manufacturing (in US$).9 Finally, we use a 
variable capturing the hours worked in manufacturing as the 
average per week.10 
[Table 2] 
Table 2 provides some summary statistics for our explanatory 
variables.  The table presents the means, standard deviations, 
minimum and maximum values for our four measures of insider 
labor power.  The table makes clear that there is great degree of 
both cross-national and temporal diversity in these variables. 
The previous section has made clear our expectations regarding the 
effects of insider labor on corporate governance. There are, 
however, a number of additional variables that we want to control 
for in our analysis. These are factors that we do not have explicit 
theoretical expectations about, but that a number of authors in the 
comparative political economy literature have suggested should 
corporate governance. 
To take account of the possible impact of economic factors on 
corporate governance, three commonly utilized “economic” 
variables are included in our analysis: the rate of GDP growth, the 
level of GDP per capita and the rate of consumer price inflation. In 
most studies of corporate governance, GDP growth is considered as 
a dependent variable to be explained by corporate governance 
(Carlin and Mayer 2000, 2003). However, inclusion of GDP growth 
as a control provides a means of testing the claim that corporate 
governance is driven by efficiency or economic performance 
considerations. Such a theory suggests some kind of a link between 
                                                 
9 Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
10 Source: ILO LABORSTA. 
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a superior economic performance and the adoption of minority 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance. Inclusion of GDP per 
capita is a way of testing the idea that higher levels of economic 
development are associated with a greater minority shareholder 
orientation.  
The rate of consumer price inflation has not been explicitly linked 
to corporate governance by the economics literature. However, it is 
included here due to its potential impact on several of the proxies 
that are being utilized for the dependent variable, such as the 
relative size and turnover of equity markets. In particular, the rate 
of inflation provides a way of controlling for the effect of cyclical 
factors that may exert a short-term effect on equity market 
valuation and issuance, but which are independent of the state of 
corporate governance. Interest rates would provide an alternative 
means of controlling for these cyclical effects; however, they are 
likely to be highly correlated with inflation, and are therefore not 
included as well. 
Our regressions attempt to control for the possible effects of the 
legal origin argument through the inclusion of dummy variables 
that highlight the common law, Germanic or Scandinavian legal 
origins of a country’s legal system. The default option—if a country 
is coded as a zero for each of these three dummy variable 
categories—is a French civil law legal tradition.  
We include a binary control variable in our regressions to allow for 
the proportional or majoritarian nature of electoral rules. As has 
been discussed, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that corporate 
governance may be related to country size. Consequently, 
population is also included as a control variable in our regressions, 
to allow for the possibility that smaller countries may experience 
greater pressure to favor the interests of minority shareholders. 
This also controls for the possible effects of demographics as an 
explanatory variable, which has been suggested by some 
commentators (O’Sullivan 2000). 
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Finally, our regressions include left and right partisanship control 
variables (from Armingeon 2005), which can be used to assess the 
contrasting claims of Roe (2003) and Cioffi and Hoepner in respect 
of the corporate governance policy orientation of left government.  
The specification adopted in the empirical analysis is as follows: 
Yit= β0+β1Yit-1+β2X1it+…+βnXnit+εit 
where β0 represents a general intercept, X1 to Xn are the 
explanatory variables, β1 to βn are the slopes of the explanatory 
variables, and εit denotes the errors. 
We present results for two models. First, we estimate random 
effects and specifying no heteroscedasticity. The existence of 
country-specific factors not included in the analysis (country-
specific omitted variables) could affect the accurate estimation of 
our model.  Like most analyses in comparative political economy, it 
is reasonable to assume that there are a number of country-specific 
effects that cannot be introduced explicitly into our models (specific 
historical circumstances, difficult to capture institutional 
developments, etc).  To deal with these the variables, we produce a 
set of estimates with random effects.11 
We also performed a modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity. 
This test, however, revealed a significant amount of 
heteroscedasticity. We therefore present a second set of results with 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Beck and Katz (1995) 
show that PCSEs are consistent when there is heteroscedasticity. 
                                                 
11 An alternative would be to estimate models with fixed effects, but our need to 
include time-invariant explanatory variables in our analysis makes this 
impossible.  For details on estimating random effects with panel data, see Hsiao 
(1986).  





The results of our analyses are presented in Tables 3 to 6. In each 
table we use an alternative measure of corporate governance and 
different models in each table reflect alternative measures for 
insider labor power. We present both the random effects (RE) and 
the PCSE results side by side. We present the estimates for our 
measure of insider power first and then those for the rest of 
explanatory variables. 
[Tables 3 to 6] 
The tables make clear that our two methods to estimate the effects 
of insider labor power make very little difference to the results. 
Because of the results of the modified Wald test for panel-specific 
heteroscedasticity mentioned above, we will refer to the PCSE 
results in the paragraphs below. 
Employment protection emerges as a very significant determinant 
of corporate governance in Tables 3 to 6. While employment 
protection is not a significant determinant of international equity 
issuance (Table 5), it is clearly associated with less equity market 
capitalization (Table 3), fewer shares traded (Table 4) and lower 
values in the index of minority shareholder protection (Table 6).12 It 
is clear then that higher levels of employment protection for insider 
labor promote a more blockholder dominated system of corporate 
governance. 
A similar picture emerges when we measure insider labor power as 
wage growth in the manufacturing sector.  While wage growth in 
                                                 
12 These results are only present in the models with PCSEs and are not confirmed 
in those with random effects. 
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manufacturing is not a significant determinant of the index of 
minority shareholder protection (Table 6), it is clearly associated 
with less equity market capitalization (Table 3), fewer shares traded 
(Table 4) and less international equity issuance (Table 5).13 As in the 
previous two cases, this measure of insider labor power promotes a 
system of corporate governance dominated by insider capital. 
The effects of hours worked in manufacturing as very similar to 
those of wage growth (although, as suggested by our model, in the 
opposite direction). While hours worked in manufacturing are not 
a significant determinant of the index of minority shareholder 
protection (Table 6), they are significantly associated with more 
equity market capitalization (Table 3), more shares traded (Table 4) 
and more international equity issuance (Table 5). As insider labor 
gets weaker (and hours in manufacturing increase), corporate 
governance becomes more open to minority shareholders. 
Turning now to our control variables, the results for the legal origin 
dummies are mixed. The common law and Scandinavian law 
dummies are often positive and significant, while the coefficient of 
the German dummy is often insignificant. We include a dummy 
variable in our regressions indicating the proportional or 
majoritarian nature of electoral rules. Our results show a significant 
negative relationship with our regulatory proxy for corporate 
governance (confirming Pagano and Volpin’s results). With the rest 
of our corporate governance measures, however, the relationship is 
rarely significant and it does not retail its negative sign. 
Our regression analysis includes a control variable for trade 
openness—measured by imports plus exports as a share of GDP—
and capital openness, which takes the form of a dummy variable 
                                                 
13 The lack of significance when analyzing the index of minority shareholder 
protection may be caused by the fundamentally cross-sectional nature of the 
dependent variable. 
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indicating whether capital controls are present or not. Our results 
suggest that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
trade openness and our three proxies for actual corporate 
governance outcomes. However, the relationship is less convincing 
with respect to our regulatory proxy for corporate governance 
(although the latter is a much shorter time series). The capital 
controls dummy does not exhibit much significance in explaining 
any of our dependent variable proxies. As we do not look at the 
interaction of trade openness and capital controls, our results are 
not directly comparable with those of Rajan and Zingales. 
However, our result is broadly compatible with their theoretical 
claims, although it is subject to the same endogeneity problem that 
they identify. 
Rajan and Zingales use country size—as measured by population—
as an instrument for trade openness in their empirical analysis. 
Population is also included as a control variable in our regressions, 
although it is used in addition to trade openness rather than as a 
substitute. Our results offer no evidence of a significant 
relationship between population and our regulatory proxy for 
corporate governance. However, the relationship with our three 
measures of actual corporate governance behavior is statistically 
significant in some regressions, and positive in sign, i.e. size of 
country tends to suggest a more shareholder governance 
orientation. Once again, this appears to be broadly consistent with 
Rajan and Zingales results, although our analysis is not entirely 
comparable. 
Our regressions include left and right partisanship control variables 
(from Armingeon 2005), which can be used to assess the contrasting 
claims of Roe (2003) and Cioffi and Hoepner (2006) in respect of left 
government. Our results offer some support for Cioffi and 
Hopner’s claims. The coefficient on the Left government variable is 
invariably positive, indicating that more left-wing governments are 
associated with more minority shareholder-oriented corporate 
governance outcomes over the estimation period. However, the 
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statistical significance of this result is quite unstable, depending on 
which corporate governance proxy is used. Contradicting Roe 
(2003), there is certainly little evidence of a simple negative 
relationship between left government and blockholding.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have explained corporate governance change in 
terms of the relative strength of a particular cleavage of labor: 
insider labor. It is the strength of this sub-group—rather than labor 
in general—that is most relevant for the determination of corporate 
governance outcomes. Insider labor affects corporate governance 
via its relationship with a particular type of shareholder actor: 
blockholders (or insider capital). Similar corporate governance 
outcomes would not be expected in a system where blockholders 
did not exist, even if insider labor was a powerful actor. Nor is the 
power of insider labor necessarily synonymous with Left 
government, in contrast to the Labor power-Left government axis 
suggested by Roe (2003). 
Our empirical results are also not supportive of a negative 
relationship between Left partisanship and shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance. Our data suggests that causation has 
recently been operating quite differently. Left government appears 
to be heavily implicated in the shift towards shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance. However, unlike Cioffi and Höpner (2006), 
we do not argue that the changed relationship between 
partisanship and corporate governance is reflective of a volte face in 
the material interests of left or right-wing party political actors. 
Rather, we believe that partisanship is interacting in a complex 
manner with changes in the relative strength of insider labor. It is 
the latter that is the underlying source of recent variation in 
corporate governance. The precise nature of the interaction of 
insider labor with partisanship is the subject of a future paper. 
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Table 1: Corporate Governance in Industrialized Democracies 
Australia 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0.0012879 0.0016097 0.0092521 0.0167799 0.0095298 0.0105288 0.0112474 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.3129979 0.5089837 0.3464832 0.6578772 0.9580936 1.012937 0.9287608 1.120894 1.229933 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0575194 0.0906499 0.1266434 0.2646715 0.5816625 0.6513509 0.7200109 0.7080033 0.8319433 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    4 4 4 4   
Austria          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0.0012369 0.0017011 0.0073525 0.0010517 0.0073003 0.0035555 0.0175796 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0225862 0.0686658 0.0709762 0.1382706 0.1572141 0.1288925 0.1634206 0.1462524 0.3025632 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0013212 0.0102357 0.115092 0.1095473 0.0492883 0.0381245 0.0283058 0.0427099 0.0839626 
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Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    2 3 3 3   
Belgium          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0012071 0 0.0007229 0.0254057 0.0035225 0.0065388 0.0039749 0.0140068 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0823125 0.2519377 0.331931 0.3793998 0.799319 0.730218 0.5321929 0.573256  
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0068806 0.0226455 0.032585 0.0551207 0.1665078 0.1810103 0.1381608 0.1242248  
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    2 2 2 2   
Canada          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0002852 0.0001742 0.0030945 0.0082657 0.0051086 0.0073118 0.0019848 0.0110231 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.4459516 0.4192071 0.4213226 0.6298015 1.178748 0.9944102 0.7910613 1.062704 1.201838 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0925435 0.2050711 0.187867 0.8643542 0.8891956 0.6549149 0.5602022 0.5545095 0.6686107 
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Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    5 5 5 5   
Denmark          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0.0007499 0.0022193 0.0063201 0.0018837 0.0046415 0 0.0148122 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0788834 0.2523008 0.2929141 0.3119405 0.6804575 0.5962347 0.4452951 0.5740818 0.6227289 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0008473 0.0212925 0.0832709 0.1439333 0.5786663 0.4431857 0.2992329 0.3161672 0.4382986 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    2 2 2 2   
Finland          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0.0007301 0.0046256 0.0366957 0.0164984 0.0121611 0.0012355 0.0085746 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0412958 0.1077114 0.1658932 0.3402714 2.448893 1.571104 1.055224 1.051993 0.9848251 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0069524 0.009235 0.0287161 0.1465222 1.723388 1.477007 1.341264 1.009848 1.205016 
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Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    3 3 3 3   
France          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0001349 0.0009835 0.0034743 0.0131018 0.0121096 0.0064861 0.008489  
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0916096 0.1065493 0.2576529 0.3358822 1.095576 0.8173499 0.5501564 0.6769475  
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0169763 0.0197885 0.0957995 0.2345468 0.8203884 0.7497817 0.5318389 0.4970463  
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    3 3 3 4   
Germany          
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0023278 0.0004787 0.0024812 0.0215476 0.0031795 0.0027189 0.007074 0.0061892 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0802663 0.2673605 0.2124487 0.23485 0.6791735 0.5775566 0.3454122 0.4490031 0.4400637 
2007] LABOR MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 45 
 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0170697 0.1041304 0.300242 0.2332979 0.5716369 0.7649995 0.6082242 0.5442781 0.5680395 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    2 3 3 3   
Greece          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0.0011894 0 0.0017842 0.0042645 0.0097739 0.0150984 0.0073746 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.061794 0.0186265 0.1811281 0.1451211 0.9887943 0.7380803 0.5041941 0.6192899 0.6157374 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.001762 0.0004139 0.0466737 0.0518132 0.8484403 0.3187789 0.1869817 0.2241073 0.2200569 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    3 3 3 3   
Ireland          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0 0.0075227 0.0126645 0.0068174 0.0041077 0.0026022 0.0092613 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP  0.1274233  0.3884269 0.8641669 0.7333388 0.492407 0.5534154 0.6215156 
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Value of equity traded divided by GDP    0.1953945 0.1523118 0.2194615 0.2703167 0.2863018 0.2480208 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    4 4 4 4   
Italy          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0002346 0.0000907 0.0032812 0.0053035 0.0053191 0.0023605 0.0040182 0.0107038 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.056367 0.1372483 0.1349498 0.1909651 0.7149137 0.4836676 0.4021965 0.4187399 0.4721411 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0191024 0.0323332 0.0386128 0.0792071 0.7242576 0.5155395 0.455155 0.451682 0.5820334 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    1 5 5 5   
Japan          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0.0002961 0.0000379 0.0018331 0.0016577 0.0006293 0.0014648 0.0017087 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.3572602 0.7215347 0.9598598 0.694161 0.665229 0.5409942 0.520908 0.6866301 0.7694935 
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Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.1690545 0.2897926 0.5271546 0.2331135 0.4878779 0.4387484 0.3941675 0.4954152 0.696464 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    4 4 4 5   
Luxembourg          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0.0180489 0.0055302 0.0765171 0.0050862 0.0094427 0.0037741 0.0995408 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.7695358 3.189147 0.9435971 1.683547 1.735224 1.209646 1.159119 1.409004 1.610108 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0066412 0.0090701 0.0078513 0.0113368 0.0614687 0.0219723 0.0231819 0.0157759 0.0206756 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)          
Netherlands          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0022713 0.0027141 0.0077143 0.0685304 0.029687 0.0157724 0.0140762 0.0116066 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.1644742 0.4494429 0.4065158 0.8593768 1.727981 1.193264 0.959401   
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Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.028623 0.1276789 0.1363783 0.5993201 1.827147 2.691279 1.104824 0.9061214  
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    2 2 2 2   
New Zealand          
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0 0 0.0038333 0.0076899 0.0150177 0 0.0020063 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP  0.3836002 0.2025526 0.5253467 0.3577594 0.3417978 0.3631249 0.4153447 0.4386861 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP  0.040939 0.0443163 0.1382344 0.2066901 0.1620266 0.1246971 0.1317172 0.171249 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    4 4 4 4   
Norway          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0015709 0.0025838 0.003379 0.0095862 0.0235657 0.0015735 0.0067918 0.0151898 
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Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0501206 0.1580776 0.2250499 0.3013164 0.389644 0.406827 0.33657 0.434314 0.5653397 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0013198 0.0294854 0.1205434 0.165029 0.3602263 0.3083163 0.2564486 0.3168295 0.5432885 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    4 4 4 4   
Portugal          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0 0 0.0046624 0.0178476 0 0 0.0067614 0.0071309 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0063953 0.0077993 0.1287533 0.1712234 0.5700017 0.4216764 0.3514151 0.3940862  
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.000067 0.0002031 0.0236069 0.0394722 0.5107617 0.2482778 0.1667757 0.1450246  
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    3 4 4 4   
Spain          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0005819 0.0003922 0.0025677 0.014953 0.0042764 0.0056472 0.0026233 0.0065561 
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Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.0754646 0.1137132 0.2211763 0.3385718 0.8975711 0.8008968 0.7044637 0.8659647 0.9487927 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.004434 0.0196807 0.080328 0.1023497 1.754943 1.431067 1.547608 1.115088 1.217498 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    4 4 4 4   
Sweden          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0009563 0.0012492 0.0048355 0.0454986 0.0100265 0.0219846 0.0036471 0.0155887 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.09946 0.3566432 0.3835137 0.717457 1.370548 1.059901 0.7429855 1.06111 1.090813 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0133678 0.1052292 0.0694802 0.3755418 1.628078 1.374483 0.906429 0.8746751 1.337213 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    3 3 3 3   
Switzerland          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0140468 0.0004241 0.002859 0.0410168 0.0279397 0.036434 0.0156192 0.011684 
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Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.3388718 0.9030107 0.6787062 1.377452 3.217654 2.080267 2.232193 2.271357 2.306478 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.1195037 0.453214 0.2198946 0.987702 2.47375 1.200891 2.392721 1.797998 2.196045 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    2 2 2 2   
UK          
International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.000439 0.0035371 0.0050225 0.0221628 0.0215251 0.0094647 0.0045128 0.0099491 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.3827458 0.7200342 0.8578528 1.240424 1.790388 1.549615 1.141645 1.351525 1.315302 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.0574518 0.2222952 0.3189664 0.5695137 1.316939 1.308205 2.557039 2.019084 2.417757 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    5 5 5 5   
USA          
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
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International equity issuance divided by GDP  0.0000474 0.000448 0.0013518 0.0070999 0.002419 0.000124 0.0002363 0.0001278 
Equity market capitalization divided by GDP 0.5188438 0.5507509 0.5272098 0.9269999 1.538564 1.363592 1.050293 0.7130752 0.8636631 
Value of equity traded divided by GDP 0.1469136 0.236286 0.3017804 0.6905693 3.245653 2.867378 1.736237 0.6046872 0.8214002 
Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)    5 5 5 5   
 
 




Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+ 
Employment  
Protection       |                                            | 
         overall |  1.092545   .5650517         .1          2 |      
         between |             .5635979         .1   1.909833 |      
         within  |             .1404808  -.0040064   1.435994 |      
Wage Growth 
Manufacturing    |                                            | 
         overall |  6.473011   11.61639  -28.43137   45.61404 |      
         between |             .9622613   4.588679   7.875384 |      
         within  |             11.57863  -27.63195   44.21166 |     
Hours Worked 
Manufacturing    |                                            | 
         overall |  39.08175   2.197446       34.8       46.8 |      
         between |             2.589281   36.29091       46.7 |      
         within  |              .4887782  37.59084   40.62175 | 
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Table 3: The Determinants of Corporate Governance, 
Measured as Equity Market Capitalization (US$ mn) / GDP 
 RE PCSE RE PCSE RE PCSE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment -0.176 -0.180     
Protection (1.76) (2.19)*     
Wage Growth   -0.003 -0.004   
(Manufacturing)   (2.39)* (2.53)*   
Hours Worked     0.168 0.168 
(Manufacturing)     (5.03)** (5.45)** 
Left 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.005 
Government (0.32) (1.80) (1.59) (2.78)** (2.56)* (3.90)** 
Right -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Government (0.14) (3.54)** (0.19) (3.48)** (1.71) (2.72)** 
Common Law 0.302 -0.052 0.552 0.048 0.032 0.032 
2007] LABOR MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 55 
 
Legal Origin (1.89) (0.84) (2.56)* (0.61) (0.17) (0.22) 
German 0.003 -0.015 0.150 0.120 -0.389 -0.389 
Legal Origin (0.02) (0.16) (0.78) (2.27)* (2.08)* (2.23)* 
Scandinavian 0.117 -0.149 0.317 -0.082 0.086 0.086 
Legal Origin (0.76) (2.44)* (1.48) (1.29) (0.38) (0.28) 
Capital 
Controls -0.006 -0.116 0.015 -0.114 0.417 0.417 
 (0.17) (2.87)** (0.33) (2.36)* (1.39) (2.89)** 
GDP Growth 0.023 0.020 0.030 0.031 0.048 0.048 
 (3.90)** (3.12)** (3.74)** (3.30)** (1.36) (1.47) 
GDP per 0.011 0.020 0.009 0.026 0.038 0.038 
Capita (4.27)** (6.25)** (2.89)** (5.83)** (3.40)** (3.13)** 
Trade 0.006 -0.001 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.003 
Openness (3.75)** (1.17) (6.16)** (0.60) (1.23) (1.31) 
Inflation -0.010 -0.003 -0.010 -0.003 0.008 0.008 
 (2.36)* (0.55) (1.88) (0.46) (0.23) (0.24) 
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Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.38)* (0.03) (3.08)** (0.74) (0.74) (1.03) 
Corporatism -0.053 -0.005 -0.082 -0.038 -0.384 -0.384 
 (3.44)** (0.27) (4.15)** (1.92) (4.38)** (4.17)** 
Proportionality -0.097 0.033 -0.216 -0.024 0.423 0.423 
 (1.01) (0.60) (1.77) (0.43) (2.08)* (2.26)* 
Constant 0.159 0.248 -0.311 -0.074 -6.285 -6.285 
 (0.68) (1.76) (1.42) (0.57) (5.09)** (5.41)** 
Observations 370 370 394 394 110 110 
Countries 18 18 18 18 14 14 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: The Determinants of Corporate Governance, 
Measured as Value of Shares Traded (US$ mn) / GDP 
 RE PCSE RE PCSE RE PCSE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment -0.127 -0.183     
Protection (1.57) (2.36)*     
Wage Growth   -0.003 -0.005   
(Manufacturing)   (2.54)* (3.61)**   
Hours Worked     0.127 0.127 
(Manufacturing)     (4.94)** (5.32)** 
Left -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 
Government (1.17) (1.47) (0.54) (0.51) (1.82) (2.97)** 
Right -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
Government (1.42) (0.01) (1.77) (0.55) (0.20) (0.31) 
Common Law -0.034 -0.088 0.071 0.086 -0.375 -0.375 
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Legal Origin (0.24) (1.06) (0.39) (2.06)* (2.58)** (3.20)** 
German 0.366 0.050 0.497 0.124 0.030 0.030 
Legal Origin (2.77)** (1.29) (2.47)* (1.90) (0.20) (0.27) 
Scandinavian 0.190 -0.081 0.383 -0.020 -0.069 -0.069 
Legal Origin (1.48) (1.71) (1.91) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) 
Capital Controls 0.027 0.003 0.094 0.048 1.310 1.310 
 (0.91) (0.10) (2.32)* (1.09) (4.46)** (3.89)** 
GDP Growth 0.017 0.018 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.023 
 (3.66)** (3.97)** (3.68)** (3.57)** (0.84) (1.08) 
GDP per 0.005 0.016 0.007 0.023 0.034 0.034 
Capita (2.74)** (5.35)** (2.23)* (5.64)** (3.69)** (3.34)** 
Trade 0.007 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.005 0.005 
Openness (5.51)** (0.36) (7.12)** (2.36)* (2.47)* (2.95)** 
Inflation -0.006 -0.000 -0.007 -0.002 0.019 0.019 
 (1.79) (0.07) (1.51) (0.31) (0.72) (0.87) 
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Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (4.18)** (0.69) (5.41)** (1.76) (0.02) (0.02) 
Corporatism -0.026 -0.013 -0.032 -0.038 -0.268 -0.268 
 (2.20)* (1.34) (1.81) (2.85)** (3.88)** (4.89)** 
Proportionality -0.110 0.007 -0.192 -0.047 0.284 0.284 
 (1.42) (0.23) (1.74) (1.52) (1.79) (2.48)* 
Constant -0.190 0.131 -0.736 -0.217 -5.073 -5.073 
 (0.97) (1.21) (3.53)** (2.04)* (5.30)** (5.29)** 
Observations 360 360 385 385 109 109 
Countries 18 18 18 18 14 14 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. 
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Table 5: The Determinants of Corporate Governance, 
Measured as Value of International Equity Issuance (US$ bn) / GDP 
 RE PCSE RE PCSE RE PCSE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment -0.002 -0.000     
Protection (1.11) (0.20)     
Wage Growth   -0.000 -0.000   
(Manufacturing)   (2.99)** (3.87)**   
Hours Worked     0.001 0.001 
(Manufacturing)     (1.56) (2.01)* 
Left 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Government (0.82) (1.74) (3.13)** (4.26)** (3.67)** (5.84)** 
Right 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Government (0.77) (1.51) (2.72)** (4.16)** (2.38)* (4.08)** 
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Common Law -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.014 -0.014 
Legal Origin (0.64) (0.79) (0.41) (3.24)** (4.68)** (4.51)** 
German 0.000 -0.001 0.007 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Legal Origin (0.05) (1.73) (1.76) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Scandinavian 0.002 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.004 0.004 
Legal Origin (0.64) (0.08) (1.53) (0.18) (1.07) (1.03) 
Capital Controls -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.48) (2.63)** (0.04) (1.75) (0.11) (0.19) 
GDP Growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (1.31) (1.72) (1.20) (2.78)** (0.22) (0.25) 
GDP per 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Capita (0.17) (1.77) (0.42) (2.02)* (0.37) (0.41) 
Trade 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Openness (2.99)** (0.94) (7.07)** (5.24)** (5.62)** (4.40)** 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
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 (2.65)** (2.39)* (0.84) (0.92) (1.33) (1.56) 
Population 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.72) (2.53)* (2.40)* (0.48) (2.30)* (3.00)** 
Corporatism -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (1.98)* (2.47)* (3.38)** (4.21)** (4.60)** (3.82)** 
Proportionality 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.009 0.009 
 (1.05) (1.15) (0.44) (1.59) (2.81)** (2.46)* 
Constant 0.001 0.004 -0.012 -0.002 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.33) (1.54) (2.67)** (0.83) (1.61) (1.94) 
Observations 271 271 307 307 116 116 
Countries 18 18 18 18 14 14 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. 
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Table 6: The Determinants of Corporate Governance, 
Measured as Index of Minority Shareholder Protection 
 RE PCSE RE PCSE RE PCSE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment 0.254 1.123     
Protection (0.68) (5.24)**     
Wage Growth   -0.005 -0.006   
(Manufacturing)   (0.97) (1.08)   
Hours Worked     -0.041 -0.041 
(Manufacturing)     (0.86) (0.85) 
Left 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Government (0.97) (0.88) (1.76) (0.85) (0.78) (0.87) 
Right 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
Government (0.82) (1.33) (1.49) (0.80) (0.44) (0.45) 
Common Law 2.479 3.581 1.973 2.124 2.094 2.094 
64 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 03 
 
Legal Origin (5.13)** (12.00)** (6.13)** (11.49)** (7.07)** (7.64)** 
German 0.446 0.300 0.224 -0.018 -0.081 -0.081 
Legal Origin (1.17) (1.11) (0.61) (0.06) (0.31) (0.29) 
Scandinavian 1.113 1.198 0.782 0.674 1.163 1.163 
Legal Origin (3.14)** (5.44)** (2.22)* (2.65)** (3.85)** (4.79)** 
Capital Controls 0.062 0.469 0.051 0.534 -0.172 -0.172 
 (0.35) (2.24)* (0.24) (2.19)* (0.37) (1.33) 
GDP Growth -0.008 -0.037 0.028 0.026 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.32) (1.50) (0.88) (0.90) (0.07) (0.07) 
GDP per 0.003 0.036 -0.002 -0.005 0.004 0.004 
Capita (0.20) (3.07)** (0.14) (0.45) (0.25) (0.31) 
Trade -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
Openness (0.54) (0.36) (0.89) (2.28)* (0.29) (0.33) 
Inflation -0.093 -0.150 -0.085 -0.121 -0.061 -0.061 
 (2.40)* (3.15)** (2.03)* (2.61)** (1.02) (0.95) 
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Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.92) (0.90) (1.30) (0.26) (0.74) (1.13) 
Corporatism 0.135 0.227 0.148 0.294 0.099 0.099 
 (1.40) (3.17)** (1.46) (3.89)** (0.71) (1.08) 
Proportionality -1.083 -1.360 -0.932 -1.122 -0.933 -0.933 
 (3.00)** (10.21)** (2.52)* (7.03)** (3.28)** (6.49)** 
Constant 2.243 0.265 2.622 3.034 4.384 4.384 
 (2.76)** (0.41) (4.83)** (7.44)** (2.56)* (3.21)** 
Observations 108 108 144 144 96 96 
Countries 18 18 18 18 14 14 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. 
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